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In the past fifteen years the export logging industry in Solomon Islands
has grown from being one of several primary export industries with a
moderate and sustainable level of production, to being the largest indus-
try in the country totally dominating the national economy. Exports of
unprocessed logs now account for 50 to 60 percent of total export reve-
nues and up to 31 percent of total government revenue (King 1994;
Montgomery 1995), a situation that has come about through maximizing
the rate of extraction far above sustainable levels of forest harvesting. The
resource itself is largely owned by Solomon Islanders, yet the logging
industry is dominated by foreign companies based in Asia. Among all
those who are involved in the industry the resource owners receive the
least benefit (Duncan 1994) and have had least control over the way the
industry has developed. As a consequence they have seen one of their
most valuable resources extracted very rapidly through capital-intensive,
environmentally damaging, large-scale operations, with very little con-
tinuing economic advantage to themselves. Even though logging did offer
some prospects for economic and social development in rural areas, and
was initially accepted by many because they thought it would bring such
development, those prospects have not been realized. Instead logging has
only worsened the condition of rural people and increased the inequality
that has developed between them and the urban population.
The growth of the export logging industry has to be seen against a
background of continuing protest and concern from Solomon Islanders.
Of all the different kinds of rural development that have been tried since
World War Two this has been the most divisive and controversial. In one
locality after another, it split communities apart and brought on what39
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40 the contemporary pacific • spring 1997Scott (1989, 5) described as “everyday forms of resistance” against the
logging companies and their supporters. One outcome of this activity has
been strong interest among rural people in alternative forms of forest
development, such as different kinds of small-scale forest processing. This
interest gave rise to a loosely organized oppositional movement, starting
in Western Province in the early 1980s when that province was the lead-
ing exporter of round logs, and then gradually spreading to other prov-
inces as commercial logging expanded. The movement was encouraged
and strengthened by support from international and national nongovern-
mental organizations, the most important of which was the Solomon
Islands Development Trust (Roughan 1990, 1993, this volume). As the
movement grew in size and strength it disrupted, and in some cases
halted, logging operations, but it was not able to prevent the expansion
of large-scale commercial harvesting. What it came to represent was a
broadly based countervailing force challenging the large-scale capital-
intensive development preferred by the central government. In essence it
was similar to other “new social movements” found in third world coun-
tries and now very common in the Pacific Islands region (Larmour 1994).
The history of export logging and rural reactions to it bring into ques-
tion the role of the postcolonial state and the interests being served by
expansion of the logging industry. Examination of the distribution of ben-
efits from logging shows that after logging companies, the state has
gained most from the industry. Forest exploitation has been crucial to
maintaining foreign exchange earnings and financing further imports of
capital and consumer goods. It has also been a major contributor to gov-
ernment revenue through the duty imposed on export logs. Resource
extraction was used to bolster the economy and maintain a high level of
government spending in the early years of independence. Furthermore, it
has been carried out without much consideration for the interests of
resource owners, who have been left to work out the different options for
forestry development themselves and try to decide which option might
best serve their interests. The widespread support given to the counter-
movement shows how much the interests of the state and those of rural
people have diverged in relation to forest policy.
These issues are addressed in this paper, concentrating on the forces
that have undermined the interests of traditional resource owners and
their attempts to withstand those forces. A second struggle that will be
taken into account here involves the political and bureaucratic arms of
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the Forestry Divison attempted to institute closer controls over logging
companies and slow down the rate of logging. As the heirs of the Forestry
Department that had been set up during the late colonial period (Bennett
1995, 246), they saw their role as formulating policy and trying to man-
age forestry development in the long-term national interest. They found
themselves constantly thwarted in this role and their recommendations
countermanded by politicians who used their power in support of logging
companies.
The outcome of both these struggles was largely determined by a de
facto shift in power and administrative authority from public servants to
politicians (Connell 1988, 6), against a background of worsening eco-
nomic conditions. As government officials lost power to the politicians,
long-term economic planning and resource management were abandoned
in favor of short-term economic expediency. At the same time the ties
between foreign capital and the political elite steadily strengthened. What
started out as an opportunistic relationship in the early 1980s grew
gradually into a firm alliance by the early 1990s, as is shown by the close
relationship between the main body representing foreign logging compa-
nies, the Solomon Islands Forest Industry Association, and the ruling
Solomon Islands National Unity, Reconciliation and Progressive Party.
Such is the strength of this alliance that since the party came to power in
November 1994, the association has had far more influence over govern-
ment forest policy than the Forestry Division, even though the Forestry
Division is still officially the main adviser to the government (personal
communication).
After looking at the colonial background to present economic policy, I
review the history of export logging in Solomon Islands and the responses
of rural people, including a history of the logging industry and an account
of the rise of the anti-logging movement over the last fifteen years. I
examine how conditions changed for the movement as provincial govern-
ments started to take a more active role in logging decisions and Solomon
Islanders began to set up their own log-exporting businesses. Between
1993 and 1995, in the context of high international prices for round logs
and record levels of production, public concern over forest policy intensi-
fied, and support for slowing the rate of forest harvesting widened and
grew. For a brief period, when the National Coalition Partnership came
to power, a firm commitment to reducing log exports and regaining con-
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initiatives failed when the National Coalition Partnership collapsed and
the pro-logging government of Solomon Mamaloni was returned to
power in November 1994.
Historical Background
Solomon Islands consists of a double chain of six large islands and
numerous smaller islands stretching for around 1600 kilometers in the
southwest Pacific. The total land area is 28,369 square kilometers and sea
area (exclusive economic zone) 1.34 million square kilometers (sprep
1993, 5). In the past, these islands supported a culturally diverse and
politically fragmented population, divided into small, isolated communi-
ties linked by trade and exchange, and depending on a subsistence econ-
omy that variously combined horticulture, fishing, hunting, and gather-
ing. The present national boundaries took shape only when the British
annexed the territory in the late nineteenth century and formed a colonial
state. British and Australian plantation capital followed soon after and
led to the establishment of a plantation economy based on the production
of a single export commodity, copra (Bennett 1987; Howard and Duru-
talo 1987). Solomon Islanders were used as plantation workers under an
indentured labor system. There was no attempt to transform existing rela-
tions of production, except to encourage in the late colonial period house-
hold production of export commodities. In this way copra output was
expanded extensively, rather than intensively, and the smallholder contri-
bution to export production grew steadily in the two decades prior to
independence.
The foundation for the present export-driven economy was laid during
the pre-independence period not so much by the expansion of smallholder
production as by a new wave of foreign investment, now concentrated in
large-scale resource-based industries as well as new agricultural projects.
The investments were determined initially by government control of the
resources involved. The expansion of large-scale agriculture and forestry
was constrained by the relatively small area of alienated land owned by
the government, estimated to be around 8 percent of the total land area in
the country (Larmour 1979b, 249). Government-owned forests were
largely concentrated in Western Province and were sufficiently extensive
to allow export production from 1963 through to the early years of inde-
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ing into the more substantial forests located on customary land. Tuna
fishing, by comparison, benefited from the creation of the 200-mile exclu-
sive economic zone in January 1978.
In most of the export industries, joint ventures were formed with the
intention to reduce the heavy dependence on foreign capital and provide
the basis for steadily increasing local control over those industries (Car-
roll 1984). One major exception was forestry. An attempt to form a joint
venture with the largest logging company, Levers Pacific Timber Limited,
did not go ahead and the industry remained dominated by foreign compa-
nies without local equity.
At independence in 1978, power passed to an administrative and polit-
ical elite largely bound to continue the state-led capitalist development
introduced in the late colonial period, relying on primary export pro-
duction and foreign investment. They were also committed to a large
and increasingly expensive state apparatus, which they controlled and de-
pended on for their power, and which for the most part was centrally
located in the country’s capital and only urban center, Honiara.
This last commitment subsequently became one of the main influences
on economic management, including management of resource extraction.
Whatever ideas had existed of creating long-term development strategies
leading to self-sustaining economic growth were soon overshadowed by
the more immediate imperative of maintaining and consolidating the
state. The consequence was a much closer alliance with foreign capital
and a steady intensification of resource extraction. Two export industries
came to dominate the economy: tuna fish and round logs. Their impor-
tance was determined largely by the demand from Japan and other indus-
trializing countries of the Pacific Rim, especially Taiwan and South
Korea. Together the two commodities have made up an average two-
thirds of the total value of exports for the last fifteen years, alternating in
importance depending on relative price levels (Houenipwela 1994, 1995).
Population, Ethnicity, and Provincial Governments
The total population of Solomon Islands is now estimated to be 372,765.
The last census in 1986 showed an annual growth rate of 3.5 percent
(Groenewegen 1989, 4). The one main urban center, Honiara, has an esti-
mated population of 46,660. When smaller population centers are taken
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wide. The other 80 percent live in villages and hamlets widely distributed
throughout the islands.
Solomon Islands is noted for its cultural and linguistic diversity. There
are up to eighty different language groups, none large enough to assert
political or economic dominance nationally. Language is only one basis
for identity and not always the most salient. Of far more importance to
most people is their local clan or tribe and the community with which it is
associated. At the wider level, people also identify with large islands or
island groups, a tendency that became increasingly prominent under colo-
nial rule as a result of the greater movement and wider social interaction
brought about by labor migration, mission activity, and the introduction
of local government. At the time of independence, regional loyalty was
much stronger than any national feeling and was a major factor underly-
ing demands for decentralization. These demands led to the introduction
in 1981 of provincial governments, shortly after independence (1978).
Currently, the country is divided into nine provinces (figure 1), each
with its own elected provincial assembly. Provincial government was
intended to provide greater political autonomy to the regions and through
that to reduce economic dependence on the center. So far the former is
much more noticeable than the latter. Provinces still depend on the central
government for a large proportion of their annual budgets (SS, 17 Mar
1995). Among the many difficulties they face in taking responsibility for
provincial development are large differences in land area and resources.
The History of Commercial Logging
Large-scale commercial logging has been taking place in Solomon Islands
for just over thirty years. During that period there have been two distinct
regimes, each marked by differences in the ownership and location of the
forests being harvested, the number and size of the companies engaged in
export logging, and government management of the industry. During the
first period, from 1963 until the early 1980s, most logging took place on
government land or customary land leased by the government. According
to estimates made at the time, around one-third of the exploitable forest
was on government land (Groves et al 1985; Bennett et al 1991). The log-
ging was controlled through licenses issued by the Forestry Department.
After an initial period of fluctuating demand for timber, total output set-
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46 the contemporary pacific • spring 1997tled at around 260,000 cubic meters per year (figure 2). Around 75 per-
cent of production came from one company, Levers Pacific Timber
Limited. Soon after logging started, the government established a refores-
tation program, run by the Forestry Department, which achieved a rate of
replanting equivalent to one hectare of forest plantation for every four
hectares of natural forest cleared (Byron 1986, 21–22). There was also an
attempt to set up a national forest estate large enough to allow a long-
term cycle of sustainable logging, but it had to be abandoned when the
government failed to secure the necessary land (Larmour 1979a, 105–
106; Bennett 1995; nd).
The second period of logging began in the early 1980s and continues
today. It has been marked by a shift from government land to customary
land, which became necessary as the government-owned forests were
depleted. Moreover, with customary land making up around 87 percent
of the total land area in the country, and holding around twice as much
commercially exploitable forest as was on government land, these forests
were very attractive to prospective investors. The harvesting of forests on
customary land first began in a small way in the 1970s and then acceler-
ated quite rapidly in the early 1980s under the first Mamaloni Govern-
ment (1981–1984). The number of companies licensed to operate in-
creased fourfold from 1981 to 1983; there was a much wider spread in
the location of their operations and an overall increase in the level of pro-
duction, with output climbing in two stages, from 1980 to 1986 (when
Levers withdrew from the country), and from 1989 to the present (figure
2). Since 1992 annual timber production has climbed above 600,000
cubic meters, which is twice the volume (325,000 cubic meters) regarded
as a sustainable level of harvest by the Solomon Islands Resource Inven-
tory Project (si mnr 1994). Reforestation of government land has contin-
ued during this period, but virtually no reforestation of customary land
has occurred, except for a New Zealand–sponsored trial project on Ma-
laita (Thorpe 1988). This period also shows many undercapitalized com-
panies joining the industry, especially from 1981 to 1989 (Shield 1990).
The second period of logging came to be marked by a greatly reduced
level of control over logging companies. Even though forest legislation
was amended on several occasions with the intention of making it more
suitable for controlling logging companies working on customary land,
the principal bodies responsible for enforcing that legislation—Forestry
Division, provincial governments, and area councils—did not have the
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tice, the legislation was ineffective because compliance was left to “the
whim of the logging companies” (Boer 1992, 93). The situation was exac-
erbated by the increasing use of corrupt practices by the new companies
entering the country during this period (Larmour 1983, 270–271; si oo
1988, 1989).
The Timber Industry
Prior to 1963, commercial timber production was restricted to a number
of small timber companies, many of them producing sawn timber for
local use, others producing sawn timber and logs for export. The longest-
running company was the Kauri Timber Company based at Vanikoro, in
the Santa Cruz group. It was exporting kauri logs to Australia up to 1964
(bsip 1965, 31). Another company exporting sawn timber and logs
between 1951 and 1957 was the Tenaru Timber Company Proprietary
Limited (bsip 1955, 23; 1960, 26). The turning point for the growth of an
export timber industry came in 1962–1964 with the first demand for tim-
ber from Japan and the arrival of several new investors in export-timber
production. The three most important companies to get established dur-
ing this period were Levers Pacific Timbers Limited, a subsidiary of the
United Africa Company [Timber] Limited; Allardyce Lumber Company
Limited, formed by an Australian firm, Colonial Timber Company Lim-
ited, then operating in Sarawak; and Kalena Timber Company Limited,
financed mainly from the United States (bsip 1965, 31). These three com-
panies accounted for most timber production well into the 1980s. The
largest of the three, Levers, produced between two-thirds and three-quar-
ters of total export volume up to 1982. All three companies originally
began operations on government land, or land leased by the government,
and later moved onto customary land. During this period most export
timber production was confined to a small number of sites among the
islands that now make up Western Province (figure 1). The only substan-
tial logging to take place outside Western Province was that undertaken
by the Allardyce Timber Company on the island of Santa Isabel between
1964 and 1974.
Levers began operations on Gizo Island in 1963. In 1968 it shifted its
base to Ringi Cove on Kolombangara Island and began clearing land that
the parent company held under certificate of occupation. Through a deal
made with the government, involving the reversion of 82 percent of this
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the other 18 percent of the land and options for further timber rights on
customary land (Bennett 1995, 252). Through Levers’ operations on
Kolombangara, and through a replanting program organized by the gov-
ernment, Kolombangara became the main center of the timber industry in
the 1970s.
The intensive extraction of timber on Kolombangara brought an end to
the government-owned forests in this area and from then on Levers was
forced to seek timber-cutting rights on customary land in order to main-
tain production. The main focus of their attention was the neighboring
island of New Georgia. Except for negotiations over timber-cutting rights
on Guadalcanal by Foxwoods (BSI Timbers) Limited (which took over
and upgraded the Tenaru sawmill), Levers’ efforts to obtain further
timber-cutting rights represented the first major push onto customary
land by a commercial logging company. It gave rise to one of the longest
and most contentious episodes in the history of commercial logging and
eventually led to Levers withdrawing altogether from the Solomons in
1986 (Rence 1979; Larmour 1979a, 1981, 1989; Hailey 1982; Seed
1983; Wright 1987).
These negotiations were protracted mainly because of disagreements
over land rights and the leadership of landowning groups. The area
sought by Levers was in North New Georgia and comprised 40,000
hectares. The first attempt to negotiate timber rights started in 1972
and involved the government and resource owners. After six years of
meetings and litigation, the negotiations were deadlocked without agree-
ment on landownership or leadership (Rence 1979). To break the dead-
lock, the government proceeded to separate timber rights from land
tenure. Using special legislation passed in 1979, it formed the North
New Georgia Timber Corporation, made up of representatives from the
five main landholding groups in the area. The timber rights were trans-
ferred to the corporation, which became the main body dealing with
Levers. Disputes over landownership did not end, but were carried on
under the umbrella of the corporation’s board, affecting arguments over
board membership, policy, and distribution of the royalties received
from Levers (Larmour 1981, 136). Levers subsequently obtained timber-
cutting rights from the corporation and began operations in the area.
The protests against their operations in North New Georgia, which
led to their withdrawal from Solomon Islands, are taken up in the next
section.
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230,000 cubic meters, of which 90 percent was being exported, almost all
as unprocessed logs. The main countries buying timber were Japan (83
percent), Germany (7 percent), France (4 percent), and Korea (4 percent).
Sawn-timber production in 1978 was 10,800 cubic meters, just over two-
thirds of which was produced by Foxwoods on Guadalcanal. Fifteen
other small sawmills were producing the balance. The total area of forest
replanting up to 1979 was 17,890 hectares, representing much less than
the area that had been logged (si cpo 1980, 85–86).
The years between 1963 and 1981 represent a period of moderate
growth in timber production. Because it was small, largely confined to
one province, and working mostly on government land or land leased by
the government, the industry was easily managed by the Forestry Depart-
ment. This relatively stable regime was in marked contrast to what
followed when logging operations spread from government land to cus-
tomary land. Besides a rapid increase in the number of companies that
were granted licenses and a dramatic increase in the total allowable cut
granted to these companies, three other provinces joined Western Prov-
ince and started engaging in export logging. The three new provinces,
Guadalcanal, Malaita, and Makira-Ulawa, all comprised relatively large
islands with substantial stands of commercially attractive lowland forest.
The larger number of companies brought a marked change in the struc-
ture of the industry. The three oldest companies maintained their domi-
nant role (without Levers after 1986). The only new company of similar
size and volume of production was the Hyundai Timber Company, a sub-
sidary of the giant South Korean Hyundai Group. It started logging at
Aola in East Guadalcanal in 1983 and became the fourth largest producer
between 1983 and 1989, with 11 percent of the total volume harvested.
Hyundai was the largest producer outside Western Province. Another
South Korean conglomerate tried to obtain a license on Choiseul Island at
this time but because of opposition to their application did not obtain
their license until 1987. Eagon Resources Development Limited started
logging on Choiseul in 1989. Most of the other new companies that
entered the country in the early 1980s were small undercapitalized opera-
tions, with relatively low levels of production (averaging beween 10,000
and 20,000 cubic meters annually when operational), poor profitability,
and frequent changes of ownership. A survey of these small companies in
the late 1980s, when log prices were depressed, showed that they were
barely viable commercial operations (Shield 1990, 35).
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ciated with a much higher level of political involvement in the industry
and the frequent use of political influence in the interests of those new
companies. Regulations relating to the acquisition of timber-cutting rights
and the granting of logging licenses were routinely disregarded as political
leaders gave their support to individual logging companies seeking timber
rights in their constituencies. Officials in the Forestry Division, who were
ultimately responsible for upholding the regulations, became the main
target of this political pressure. Slowly and relentlessly they were forced
to compromise on forestry regulations and on policy guidelines relating to
management of forestry development. This is shown by cases that were
investigated by the ombudsman in the late 1980s (si oo 1988–1991).
The report on Hyundai illustrates what took place (si oo 1989, 18–42;
1991, 15). It shows a large company using its considerable powers and
influence to obtain timber rights. Originally one of the company represen-
tatives obtained a directorship and majority shareholding in a local com-
pany that had been formed in East Guadalcanal. Once Hyundai had
control of the local company they used it to form a subsidiary of the
Korean-based company. Less than twelve months later they had obtained
a license to cut 75,000 cubic meters annually for twenty years. There
was no technical assessment of the resource or the sustainability of the
volume allocated. Proper agreement was not obtained from all the re-
source owners in the area. The license was granted despite strong objec-
tions from provincial officials and the Forestry Division, a grossly unfair
and one-sided contract, and considerable confusion and ignorance among
resource owners about the intentions of the company. Inducements were
used to get around difficult or confused officials and to divide the
resource owners among themselves. One official who tried to uphold the
regulations was transferred out of the area. Ultimately, pressure from the
minister overcame the last resistance to the agreement.
Foreign companies like Hyundai readily took advantage of the divi-
sions among landholders, manipulating the limited authority exercised by
leaders (and self-appointed representatives) of landholding groups in
pursuit of timber-felling rights. They also took advantage of changes
made to the forestry legislation, which treated timber rights differently
from customary land rights. The procedures for dealing with timber
rights were speeded up in comparison with the procedures for land (si oo
1989, 11–14). The ombudsman’s report and other survey evidence show
that East Guadalcanal people were deeply divided about commercial log-
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impacts became apparent (Fitzgerald and Schoeffel 1991). Numerous dis-
putes arose as the company attempted to obtain the cutting rights it needed
and uphold earlier agreements with resource owners (si oo 1989, 32).
Another case investigated by the ombudsman involved Kayuken Pacific
Limited, which obtained a license to carry out logging in the West Kwaio
area of Malaita in 1986. The license was granted under intense political
pressure, even though a moratorium on the issuing of new logging
licenses was in place. By their action, Malaita Province forced the lifting
of the moratorium. It was found later that at least one of the local leaders
involved in vetting the company’s application was working for the com-
pany. The ombudsman’s investigation showed that the license was
granted illegally, for a quota of logs that was three times the volume rec-
ommended by the Forestry Division. There were numerous other irregu-
larities, including suspected forgery (si oo 1988, 25–42). Despite the
ombuds-man’s findings, no action was ever taken against Kayuken or any
of the officials implicated in the ombudsman’s report.
Most of the new companies that entered at this time were subsequently
surrounded by controversy once logging operations got started. The For-
estry Division did not have the staff or resources to monitor their activi-
ties, and companies were left largely to their own devices, ignoring the
regulations with impunity. Resource owners were powerless to do any-
thing about it. They found that even when contracts were broken they
could not terminate agreements made with logging companies (Boer
1992, 89).
A number of moves were made by the Forestry Division in the 1980s to
try and reassert some control over the industry. They included a two-year
moratorium on the issuing of new licenses (later extended), another
amendment to the Forest Resources and Timber Utilization Act strength-
ening the powers of area councils and provincial executives in the grant-
ing of timber rights and imposing new environmental safeguards on
logging companies, and a special form introduced called the Standard
Logging Agreement with thirty-nine clauses governing the operations of
logging companies (Fingleton 1989; Boer 1992). In 1984 the Forestry
Division also released a new policy statement calling for sustained-yield
harvesting, increased reforestation, strengthening of the Timber Control
Section, increased domestic processing, and the reduction of log exports
(si 1984). This policy statement was virtually ignored. In 1989 a new and
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again the commitment to sustained-yield management, reforestation,
domestic processing, and greater forest protection (si fd 1989).
This statement, like the previous one, made no difference to further
expansion of the timber industry. Established companies started moving
to new sites. Both Allardyce Lumber Company and Hyundai got conces-
sions on Vella Lavella, opening up the island to large-scale logging for the
first time. By 1990, licenses had been issued for a total allowable harvest
of 924,000 cubic meters per year, well above what was considered a sus-
tainable volume (Shield 1990, 13). By 1992 the allowable harvest had
risen to 1.2 million cubic meters, and by 1994 to 3.3 million cubic meters
(Hughes 1993; ss, 31 Mar 1995). Even though the National Coalition
Partnership government introduced a moratorium on the granting of new
logging licenses in March 1994, and extended it to include all licenses for
foreign and local companies in July the same year, the total licensed
volume represented around one-quarter of the total commercial volume
left in the country.
The two-tier industrial structure described earlier has continued, with
changes of ownership and consolidation at the top and the entry of many
new local companies at the bottom. Logging on customary land attracted
larger companies from Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia. These com-
panies proved as adept as their predecessors at obtaining foreign invest-
ment approval and getting concession areas for timber cutting. One
such company, Golden Springs International, came in under the North
New Georgia Timber Corporation Act, allowing it to commence opera-
tions in North New Georgia in 1989 without being subject to the ad-
ministrative control of the Forestry Division (Shield 1990, 39). New
investors like Golden Springs proceeded to acquire smaller companies
along with the licensed concession areas held by those companies. An
attempt by the ombudsman to challenge the legality of these acquisitions
failed (si oo 1988, 81–83; 1991, 14). The period from 1987 to the
present shows increasing consolidation of ownership around these new
investors. By 1994 the export logging industry was made up of eight for-
eign companies, several of which had a number of subsidiary companies.
Three of these companies controlled 75 percent of the total volume
licensed to foreign companies. The two South Korean companies, Hyun-
dai and Eagon, had another 14 percent (168,000 cubic meters) (personal
communication).
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From the time large-scale logging operations started on customary land,
there was opposition from rural people, beginning in the 1970s and con-
tinuing to grow as logging grew and expanded into other provinces. Most
of the protests originated in local communities and were directed at spe-
cific companies. Major difficulties hampered attempts to organize more
widely than this because of the poor communications within and between
islands, the constant demands imposed by the subsistence lifestyle, and
the low education and poor literacy among the majority of the popula-
tion. The wider communication that did take place was largely through
assistance from nongovernmental organizations and other outside sup-
port. Local protests were sometimes conducted within the law, at other
times illegally. They did not take the form of open confrontation so much
as different kinds of covert action or “everyday forms of resistance”
(Scott 1989, 5). They included sabotage and arson attacks on logging
camps and the destruction of property and machinery belonging to log-
ging companies. The most recent of these attacks have been in North
New Georgia, Western Province, in 1994 (SS, 22–27 Apr 1994), and on
Pavuvu Island, Central Province, in 1995 (SS, 6 Jul 1995).
Though many of these protests have been isolated events organized
independently of each other, the growth of opposition to large-scale log-
ging came to take the form of a loosely organized and widely dispersed
social movement among rural people. It is described this way because of
the shared interest in trying to stop (or at least to control) large-scale log-
ging and encourage alternative forms of forest development, and also
because of the many informal and formal connections that have grown up
between those opposed to logging. Two of the nongovernmental organ-
izations involved in the movement, Solomon Islands Development Trust
and Soltrust, hold frequent workshops and training sessions for rural
people and publish regular broadsheets reporting protests against logging
companies and publicizing small-scale, community-based forestry devel-
opment projects. The movement has not been able to achieve a high level
of mobilization or political power, but it has developed a strong national
presence. The closest it has come to influencing government policy and
setting a new direction for forestry development was during the brief term
of office of the National Coalition Partnership government in 1993–94.
The strongest protests from local communities in the 1970s and early
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On Kolombangara, the village of Iriri made a stand against the logging of
their customary land (Waddell 1993, 10–16). In New Georgia, the differ-
ences among landowning groups that had become apparent in the early
years of negotiations over timber-cutting rights were not resolved by the
formation of the North New Georgia Timber Corporation, and in 1982
people from one of the disaffected groups raided a new logging camp at
Enoghae and destroyed houses and logging machinery. The damage was
estimated to be over si$1 million. Seven people were arrested and sent to
prison for two years for their part in the raid (Hailey 1982, 51; Seed
1983). Soon after the raid the Western Provincial Assembly passed a
motion to remove Levers’ operations from Western Province. The central
government did not back this motion but set up a commission of inquiry
instead (Hailey 1982, 54). In early 1984, one of the main opponents of
Levers, a clan leader from North New Georgia, Job Dudley Tausinga, was
elected premier of Western Province after winning a seat in the provincial
assembly (SS, 20 Jan 1984; Tausinga 1992). Tausinga was also elected to
the national parliament in 1984 as the member for Roviana and North
New Georgia. Logging was one of the main election issues in that constit-
uency (Sunset News, 14 Nov 1984, 7–10). In 1984, with assistance from
the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, the Western Pro-
vincial Executive proceeded to prepare a development strategy for the
province in which they declared their opposition to foreign logging opera-
tions and their preference for small-scale forestry. The forest policy
included proposals for sustainable exploitation of the forest, closer con-
trol over logging operations, and high priority for new forestry legislation
giving better protection to resource owners (Sunset News, May 1986; Feb
1987; Mar 1987).
Unable to get access to all their concession areas and under constant
pressure from the Western Provincial Assembly and landholders in North
New Georgia, Levers decided to wind up its operations in 1986 and with-
draw completely from the Solomons (Wright 1987; IB, Oct 1986, 36, 38).
The withdrawal of the largest logging company in the country might have
led to a reevaluation of postindependence development policy and forced
a new approach to the exploitation of resources on customary land, but
this did not happen. Other foreign companies such as Allardyce, Kalena,
and Earthmovers retained their concessions and continued their opera-
tions through agreements with customary resource owners. Subsequent
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sponse from the central government, as when a ministerial delegation was
sent to the Shortland Islands in 1989 on a navy patrol boat to look into a
dispute involving Allardyce company operations (SN, 16 May 1989).
Eagon obtained its license on Choiseul and began logging in 1989. The
volume of production dropped temporarily when Levers pulled out but
soon climbed back to earlier levels (figure 2). Much of the energy shown
by the anti-logging movement had been directed at Levers, and once they
departed the movement lost some of its momentum. It also suffered a
major setback when Tausinga unexpectedly changed his views and threw
his support behind a new foreign investor in North New Georgia, the
Indonesian-based company Golden Springs International.
The main problem for the anti-logging movement was the new business
climate that became established in the 1980s, the main feature of which
was a rising level of corruption. It started as early as the first postindepen-
dence Mamaloni government between 1981 and 1984 (Larmour 1983,
270–273). In the logging industry this involved the generous use of bribes
and inducements by company representatives to gain the support of
resource owners, local community leaders, and, most critical of all, politi-
cians and other national leaders. Resource owners and political leaders
succumbed easily to these practices, which one commentator in the press
referred to as the “Asian disease” (SS, 24 Nov 1993). Some indication of
what these practices involved came to light in 1994 when the then minis-
ter of commerce, employment and trade, Joses Tuhanuku, revealed that
he had been offered si$10,000 by the managing director of a Malaysian
company, the Berjaya Group, which was then trying to get approval for a
takeover of the Star Harbour Logging Company in Makira-Ulawa Prov-
ince. Tuhanuku rejected the offer and deported the businessman involved
(SS, 20 Jul; 22 Jul; 27 Jul 1994). The prevalence of these practices has
exposed a serious weakness in postcolonial government: the lack of effec-
tive checks on executive authority, parliamentarians, and national leaders
generally. The responsibility for such checks should have come from the
leaders themselves, but the small attempts they did make were more sym-
bolic than real, as was shown by the findings of the ombudsman between
1988 and 1991 (si oo 1988–1991). Detailed investigations of several
companies showed that in the acquisition of timber-cutting rights and in
the monitoring of logging companies, corruption was very common. The
ombudsman had no power to take these matters further himself, and no
other government body took the necessary steps.
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action against logging companies shifted to Guadalcanal and Malaita
Provinces. On Guadalcanal there was increasing opposition to Hyundai’s
operations in the eastern part of the island. In trying to get agreements
from more resource owners, Hyundai precipitated a rapid increase in the
number of land disputes accompanied by increasing antagonism toward
the company (Link, Mar–Apr, Jun–Jul, Aug–Sep 1989). People originally
agreed to logging because of the income from royalties (at si$7 per cubic
meter) and because of the roads constructed by the logging company.
They later found these advantages far outweighed by the disadvantages
(Fitzgerald and Schoeffel 1991, 33). The royalties only boosted household
income for a short time and were quickly spent. Fitzgerald and Schoeffel
estimated that commercial logging provided a 15 percent increase in aver-
age household income for a period of twelve to eighteen months (1991,
20). Other problems included major environmental damage, difficulties
with royalty payments, fraudulent agreements, poor logging practices,
poor labor relations, and the divisiveness caused by land disputes
(Fitzgerald and Schoeffel 1991, 34). In 1988 the East Guadalcanal Area
Council voted unanimously to get the minister of natural resources to sus-
pend the company’s license until all complaints against it were investi-
gated. In 1989 the people showed their dissatisfaction in a by-election for
the East Guadalcanal constitutency by voting in Hilda Kari, an out-
spoken opponent of logging in the area (PIM, Aug 1989, 51–53; Link,
Jun–Jul 1989). Because of the level of protest directed at the company and
the impact this had on its activity, Hyundai was forced to reduce its oper-
ations halfway through the twenty-year period over which it was licensed
to cut timber.
The experience of commercial logging in East Guadalcanal led a num-
ber of forest owners to look for less destructive and more sustainable
forms of forest development. Portable sawmills had been introduced in
the Solomons long before logging companies started working on cus-
tomary land, but interest in them only picked up as customary resource
owners looked for alternatives to large logging operations. One of the
first places this happened was Western Province, among communities
affected by Levers. They were encouraged through educational visits from
an Australian-based conservation group, the Rainforest Information
Center (WRR, Jan 1984; Tausinga 1992, 63–64).
After Cyclone Namu hit the eastern and central Solomons in May
1986, portable sawmills were promoted by several relief agencies in an
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their houses. One of the agencies involved was the Foundation for Peo-
ples of the South Pacific. It was responsible for importing the first woka-
baot sawmills into the country (Thorpe 1992, 1). Other nongovernment
organizations started promoting smaller timber operations in the later
1980s as part of their campaign to raise awareness of alternative ways in
which forest development could take place (Link, 1989–1992). Thorpe
estimated that by 1992 there were more than seven hundred portable
sawmills in the country. The most popular brand, the “Alaskan” sawmill,
was selling at the rate of twenty per month (1992, 3).
Surveys conducted in the early 1990s by the Forestry Resource Inven-
tory Project and enquiries carried out among provincial representatives
during the same period showed a high level of interest in small-scale
methods of timber extraction (si mnr 1994; si 1993, 78–81). Given a
choice of the kind of forestry development they would prefer, rural people
from the main timber-producing provinces showed a clear preference
for methods that would allow them to extract and market the timber
themselves.
In East Guadalcanal the interest in portable sawmills came to form part
of the protest campaign being conducted against Hyundai. One resource
owner acquired his own portable machinery in the mid 1980s, slowly
taught himself how to use it, and then began training other resource
owners. Even though his brother had signed a contract with Hyundai to
log the trees on their land, Sosimo Kuki was opposed to it and persuaded
the company to drop the contract so he could cut and process the timber
himself. He subsequently set up the Komuniboli Training Centre in his
village and offered courses on portable sawmilling to other resource
owners. He was so successful that many other resource owners followed
his example and stopped Hyundai from logging their land. This is one of
the reasons Hyundai had to reduce its operations in the area (Kuki and
Thorpe 1992, 4). The adoption of portable sawmilling in direct opposi-
tion to foreign logging companies has been taken up in other locations
since then. In 1994 this was being pursued by a resource owner in north
Choiseul in an attempt to stop Eagon advancing its logging operations (SS,
29 April 1994).
In the last ten years nongovernment organizations have been the main
promoters of small-scale forest processing in Solomon Islands. They in-
clude Solomon Islands Development Trust, Soltrust (originally supported
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some Solomon Island churches. These organizations have received fund-
ing from a wide range of sources, both national and international, includ-
ing support from bilateral aid donors and some support from the central
government. Their interest in forestry has arisen out of more general in-
volvement in rural development. The two largest organizations, Solomon
Islands Development Trust and Soltrust, support only forestry projects
that are community based. They promote technology and methods that
are within the capacity of resource owners using household labor, with a
heavy emphasis on training and special courses conducted regularly in
rural areas. Soltrust formed a commercial arm in 1993, called Iumi
Tugetha Holdings Limited, with the aims of assisting small producers
improve the quality of their timber and helping them find export markets.
These developments have been supported by the central government
but, unlike the nongovernment organizations, the central government
does not see small-scale forestry organized on a community basis as an
alternative to large-scale logging. Instead it wants to encourage both
kinds of forest development in parallel with each other and to continue to
receive the short-term economic benefits from exporting unprocessed
logs. This has meant an uneasy relationship with nongovernment organ-
izations, occasionally erupting into open confrontation, as occurred most
recently in 1995 in relation to a logging operation on Pavuvu, the largest
of the Russell Islands in Central Province.
This clash involved around six thousand hectares of lowland forest on
land that was formerly owned by the joint-venture company Levers
Solomons Limited. When Levers decided to sell up and withdraw from
the Solomons, the land was transferred to the government. The land is
claimed by indigenous Russell Islanders, and the government is promising
it will return it to them in due course. A tree-felling license was issued to
an Asian company, Maving Brothers, in 1992. After some delay the com-
pany prepared to start logging in early 1995. The indigenous Russell
Islanders who oppose Maving Brothers’ operation say that they would
rather exploit the Pavuvu forests themselves in a sustainable manner,
using small-scale methods and technology. They are supported by non-
government organizations, including Greenpeace and Soltrust (SS, 15 Mar
1995). For several months in early 1995 there was a strong campaign to
prevent logging from going ahead. In the course of this campaign the anti-
logging provincial premier was forced out of office and replaced with a
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Islanders to protest and present a petition at Parliament House. In May
1995 Maving Brothers started felling and exporting trees under the pro-
tection of members of the Solomon Islands Police Field Force, with
Pavuvu Islanders continuing to threaten industrial sabotage (SS, Jan–Jul
1995; SV, Jan–Jul 1995).
The protests over logging on Pavuvu Island have been the largest car-
ried out by the anti-logging movement in the history of commercial log-
ging, and they show how much the movement has grown over the fifteen
years in which such protests have been taking place. The length of
the Pavuvu protest and the support it received nationally show the level
of concern over the present direction of forest development. The anti-
logging movement has a number of different elements. Central is the
defense of a form and scale of development that are within the capacity
and expertise of rural communities. In this respect it is a conservative
movement fighting to retain household-based production and customary
ownership of resources in the face of strong commercial pressures threat-
ening to undermine them. It has also been fighting for a more sustainable
level of exploitation of natural resources under the overall management
of the owners of those resources. Another element that came out clearly
in the Pavuvu episode is the antagonism toward foreign companies and
the kind of power they hold over the central government. One of the
strongest criticisms made against the government in its handling of the
Pavuvu logging project was that it was nothing more than a puppet of
foreign investors (SS, 6 Sep 1995).
Provincial Governments and Local Companies
The provincial government system was introduced under the 1981–1984
Mamaloni government at the same time as commercial logging started
taking off on customary land. Provincial governments were expected to
throw their support behind national development policy, with its empha-
sis on large-scale natural resource extraction. Except for the short-lived
stand against large-scale logging made by the Western provincial execu-
tive in the mid-1980s, most provincial executives have come to accept
central government policy. Being dependent on the central government
for the greater proportion of their revenue, they have not had a lot of
choice. They have come to adopt the same attitude as the central govern-
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sanctioning rapid exploitation of their lowland forests. By 1995 seven out
of nine provinces were exporting unprocessed logs. Closer examination of
what has taken in place in two of these provinces shows that they are now
coming under pressure from both foreign and local logging companies.
In Choiseul Province there is one foreign logging company, Eagon Re-
sources Development Company Limited, a subsidiary of the South Korean
multinational Eagon Group. The island of Choiseul was still part of West-
ern Province when Eagon first started negotiations for a logging license in
1983. Choiseul was very divided over the proposal, and while the com-
pany was forced to comply with the regulations and consult resource
owners, it was unable to obtain the consent required for a license. In
1985 this situation began to change as political pressure was used to cir-
cumvent the regulations. In the end the pressure prevailed and the license
was granted in 1987. The license provided for an annual allocation of
150,000 cubic meters for twenty years over the whole of Choiseul Island.
It was granted even though statutory procedures had only been completed
for 9 percent of the island. The majority of the island’s population found
that their forests had, in effect, been compulsorily acquired (si oo 1990,
12–15).
Eagon started logging in 1989, and in 1990 Choiseul separated from
Western Province and became the eighth province in the country.
Through the setting-up of the Eagon-Choiseul Foundation, much support
and assistance has flowed from Eagon to the province ever since. This
includes building a small hospital, providing educational scholarships,
sponsoring sports teams, and other services. The company is one of the
first foreign companies working on customary land to start a long-term
reforestation program, replanting logged areas. It is also building a pro-
cessing facility for veneer and plywood production (SS, 7 Sep, 4 Nov
1994). Since the company began logging, court injunctions have been
served against it for trespass and environmental damage. There has also
been a marked increase in land disputes (Link, 1991; SS, 15 Jan 1993).
Eagon has the political support it needs, both provincially and nationally,
for long-term forestry-based development, but in Melanesia that has not
always been enough to ensure the security of large-scale resource extrac-
tion. In Solomon Islands the political support has been easiest to obtain;
agreement at the local level has been much more difficult. Choiseul
people are still strongly divided over the kind of deal they have been
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average prices for their timber, conversion of customary land into fast-
growing plantations, damage to the environment, social unrest, and being
employed as wage laborers by a company that is exploiting their
resources (SS, 26 Apr, 23 June 1995).
One of the most extreme cases of forest depletion in the last fifteen
years has been Malaita Province. Deforestation has been carried out
mostly by foreign companies, but more recently local companies have
become involved and the competition for what remains of the lowland
forests has increased dramatically. Malaita is 4225 square kilometers in
area and the third largest province after Western and Guadalcanal. It is
also the most heavily populated province in the country with around 28
percent of the national population.
Until 1982 no large-scale logging was undertaken in Malaita Province,
and commercial timber production was confined to four small sawmills.
A survey of the province’s timber resources showed around 725,000 cubic
meters of commercial exploitable timber. The province was advised that
with proper management and some reforestation the existing resources
would be enough to meet the long-term needs of the small sawmills
(Groom and Associates 1982, 24–25). Despite this recommendation the
provincial executive proceeded to approve a number of large-scale log-
ging operations, inviting rapid liquidation of the forests by offering
grossly excessive volumes to the companies concerned. The most contro-
versial of these approvals was that given to Kayuken Pacific Limited in
1986 (mentioned earlier). In 1990 Golden Springs International bought
into a local company, Waibona Sawmilling Association, and started log-
ging in West Kwaio. The company bought out Kayuken in 1991 and
became the largest operator in the province.
Within less than ten years the approach to forest management shifted
from an emphasis on sustainable management of the forests for the long-
term benefit of local sawmills to a policy that favored maximal extraction
of the resource for the benefit of foreign companies and their local part-
ners. The main gains for the province have been the annual business
license fee paid by each company, the employment opportunities, and the
royalties paid to resource owners. For these limited benefits there has
been rapid clearing of lowland forest associated with widespread environ-
mental devastation. The small sawmills that operated previously have
been forced out of business by competition for timber from the large log-
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boat-building industry that was located in and around Auki, have been
wound down for lack of timber. No post-logging development has been
started or proposed in the areas that have been harvested.
In 1992 local companies started moving into the log export trade. Ndai
Island Sawmill Limited obtained a license to remove 12,000 cubic meters
from Ndai Island, a small island (17 square kilometers) 40 kilometers off
the north coast of Malaita. The timber was cut out in two shiploads for a
gross value of over si$4 million (SV, 18 Jun 1993). The Ndai Island busi-
nessman behind this venture has since become one of the leading local
entrepreneurs involved in export logging.
When the National Coalition Partnership government introduced a
new sawmilling license for local companies in 1993, with provision for a
one-off export quota intended to allow them to raise the capital needed
for setting up in the timber industry (SV, 18 Mar 1994), fourteen local
companies were formed in Malaita Province. The pressure from these
local companies, coming on top of the timber allocated to foreign compa-
nies, heightened the trend toward rapid exploitation of the last-remaining
forests in the province. By November 1994 the annual volume of timber
allocated to foreign and local companies was 690,000 cubic meters. The
annual allowable cut recommended by the National Forest Resource In-
ventory for long-term sustainable harvesting of the forests is 19,800 cubic
meters (si mnr 1994). Both the provincial and the national governments
would appear to have completely given up any responsibility whatsoever
for the long-term management of forest resources.
The expansion of large-scale logging over the last six years has been
rapid and relentless, taking in most islands, both large and small, in
which there is any natural lowland forest remaining. In some cases, like
Ndai Island, tracts of forest small enough to provide only one or two
shiploads of logs have been involved. Provincial governments have largely
thrown their weight behind the central government policy of liquidating
the lowland natural forest as rapidly as possible and maximizing rents
through accelerated depletion of the resource.
Conclusion
When the Solomon Islands Government released its Forest Policy State-
ment in 1989, many believed that it heralded a new era in forest develop-
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forestry and allowed for further exploitation of the forests; it also urged
much stricter management of forest resources for long-term sustainable
use, greater investment in reforestation, closer control over the logging
industry, more support for the work of the Forestry Division, more equi-
table sharing of the benefits from forest harvesting, and greater participa-
tion in forestry development by Solomon Islanders (si fd 1989). The
policy was approved by parliament and saw two new Australian-funded
projects—the Forest Resource Inventory Project and the Timber Control
Unit Project—being started in line with the objectives. As it turned out,
these and other initiatives fell far short of what was intended. In reality,
1989 marked a different kind of turning point in forest development, the
main feature of which was a much closer alliance with international capi-
tal through the arrival of new Asian investors and further intensification
of forest exploitation without any of the controls, or the stepped-up
reforestation and more equitable sharing of the benefits, that had been
called for.
The main justification for this divergence between policy and practice
was the worsening economic situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
marked by an unfavorable balance of payments, expanding budget defi-
cits, and growing government debt (Callick 1991; Fallon and Karabalis
1992). At the time little attempt was made to moderate government
spending or adopt a less-expansionary fiscal policy; instead more concern
was expressed with trying to expand export production. The main benefi-
ciaries of this approach to economic management were state employees, a
large proportion of whom were urban based; excessive natural resource
extraction was being sanctioned in order to preserve the relatively large
state apparatus that had grown up since independence and the urban bias
associated with it (unicef 1993).
The anti-logging movement represents an ongoing attempt to regain
control over rural development. It has never been a well-organized move-
ment and does not have anywhere near the same influence over the
government as the highly unionized public servants and private-sector
workers (Frazer 1992). It has been unable to slow the rate of logging
because much of its following is found among the scattered rural popula-
tion, and all the protest action they have taken has been carried out
in divided communities, in isolated local situations, with limited impact
and success. The most successful action was that taken against Levers
in North New Georgia, forcing the withdrawal of the company. There has
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been strong enough to hold up tree-clearing operations; in others it has
prevented companies from getting a tree-felling license. The most recent
case has been in West ‘Are‘are, Malaita Province, where a logging com-
pany has been trying to get a tree-felling license for more than six years.
During that time there has been an intense and bitter fight between pro-
and anti-logging factions in the local community. Both factions have their
supporters among West ‘Are‘are wage earners, professionals, and busi-
nesspeople in Honiara, and the fight has been pursued in both locations.
So far, the anti-logging faction has outmaneuvered the other group and
held off the logging company (Naitoro 1993). In other places, like Pavuvu
Island, anti-logging protesters have been less successful.
The most critical period for the anti-logging movement came between
1993 and 1995. Following a steep rise in overseas prices for round logs,
rapid expansion in export production, and huge windfall profits being
secured by logging companies, national debate over forest policy heated
up and support grew for phasing out log exports and restricting the activ-
ities of foreign logging companies. A report made in 1994 highlighted the
massive loss in revenue to resource owners and to the government through
underreporting of harvest volume and underreporting of log prices. Dun-
can estimated that in 1993, when logs were commanding record prices
internationally, the surplus that was foregone through underreporting
was si$130 million, an amount estimated to be 35 percent of gross
domestic product and 53 percent of government revenue (1994, 40–44).
When the National Coalition Partnership came to power in June 1993
(Premdas and Steeves 1994), it set about trying to reduce the level of
export logging and restoring government management of forest develop-
ment (Tuhanuku 1995). It introduced a price-monitoring system,
strength-ened the operations of the Timber Control Unit in monitoring
logging operations and timber exports, raised the export duty on round
logs, started work on a National Forest Action Plan, advanced the intro-
duction of new forestry legislation, set 1997 as the date for phasing out
all log exports, made plans to engage a foreign trade inspection company
for surveillance of log shipments, and increased the proportion of logging
revenue being returned to the forest owners by guaranteeing them 20
percent of the export duty on round logs (SS, 1993–1994; SV, 1993–1994;
Grynberg 1994).
The National Coalition Partnership made little progress with these
reforms before it was brought down by a succession of cabinet resigna-
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reasons for their being forced out of office. In late 1994 Solomon Mama-
loni returned to power at the head of the Solomon Islands National Unity,
Reconciliation and Progressive Pati (sinurpp). Mamaloni is the director
of a log-exporting company and among national politicians has always
been one of the strongest advocates of large-scale logging. Once in office,
the sinurpp government immediately began dismantling all the reforms
introduced by the National Coaltion Partnership, reducing the export
duty on round logs, putting back the date for halting log exports, halting
work on the National Forest Action Plan and new forestry legislation,
and rejecting any need to improve monitoring of logging operations and
surveillance of log shipments. They dismissed foreign technical advisers
working in the Forestry Division and reduced the operations of the Tim-
ber Control Unit (SS, 1994–1995; SV, 1994–1995).
The outcome of all this is a return to the kind of conditions that pre-
vailed in the 1980s, when there was very little government control over
the logging industry. However, one critical difference helps to account for
the collapse of the National Coalition Partnership and its reforms, and
that is a much higher level of participation by Solomon Islanders in the
logging industry. This was boosted by the new sawmilling license for local
companies that was introduced in 1993. By the end of 1994 there were
forty local companies and they had been allocated a total export quota of
1.43 million cubic meters (personal communication). With more and
more Solomon Island businessmen engaged in log exporting, the forestry
sector has become important to capital accumulation among the business
and political elite.
With these changes there is now an uncompromising determination on
the part of the sinurpp government to maximize exploitation of the last
remaining lowland forests on customary land. They introduced a policy
document immediately after coming into power, with nationalistic attacks
on conservationists, foreign advisers, and “foreign concepts of develop-
ment” (sinurpp 1994; si opm 1994). They introduced another expan-
sionary budget with a record deficit in early 1995, and engaged in
unprecedented attacks on nongovernment organizations involved in the
anti-logging movement during the protests over logging on Pavuvu
Island. They also made it clear by the use of the paramilitary forces on
Pavuvu Island that they would not tolerate interference with logging
operations by local protesters.
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dence and has relied on large-scale, capital intensive resource extraction,
has brought deep divisions in Solomon Island society. Export logging has
been the most intrusive and destructive resource-based industry so far.
The oppositional movement that formed in response to this situation con-
tinues to mobilize rural Solomon Islanders in defense of alternative forms
of development. It is now much stronger and more active nationally than
it has been at any time in the past, but it is pitted against a ruling elite that
is far less committed to democratic decision-making and more popular
forms of rural development than it is to fostering, in its own interest and
the interests of foreign capital, intensive exploitation of the last-remaining
forests in the country.
* * *
Much of this paper was written during study leave in 1995. My thanks to the
University of Otago for this support and for an earlier research grant that
enabled me to visit Solomon Islands in 1993. Special thanks to John Naitoro for
helping to maintain my interest in forestry and keep me up with new develop-
ments. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Kathy Barlow and Steven
Winduo for their assistance in preparing this paper.
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Abstract
Large-scale logging began in Solomon Islands in 1963. Since then there have
been two distinct regimes. The first lasted until the early 1980s and the early
years of independence. It involved a small number of companies harvesting gov-
ernment-owned forests or government-leased forests, confined to a few isolated
locations, operating under close government supervision. The second regime
came about through the expansion of logging to customary land. There was a
greater spread of operations, with an increased number of companies and much
less central-government control. Resource owners had little real protection
against foreign loggers. This paper concentrates on the second period, reviewing
the history of the logging industry during this time and the extreme divisiveness it
brought about in rural areas. As logging expanded there emerged a loosely orga-
nized anti-logging movement in provinces affected by logging. The movement
came to represent a direct challenge to the large-scale, capital-intensive develop-
ment policy followed by the postcolonial state. The movement has had some
local successes against logging companies but has failed to match the power
being wielded by the logging industry and failed to slow the high rate of timber
extraction nationally.
keywords: logging, Melanesia, new social movements, Solomon Islands
